theme. 1 One year later, in September 2013, it was officially broadcast as one of Xi's signature foreign policy propositions under the rubric of the "New Silk Road for the Twenty-first Century." 2 In advocating this approach China is not isolated. Countries from the opposite ends of the Eurasian continent -Turkey, Russia, Kazakhstan, and South Korea above all 3 -have also long corroborated a discourse of "connectivity," which eventually emerged as pivotal during the tenth Asia-Europe Meeting in Milan, Italy, in October 2014. Contrasted with the opportunities generated through the globalized "commons" -oceanic and air routes, outer 1. It is also often translated as "March Westward" or "Westwards." Wang Jisi, "March West: Rebalancing China's Geopolitical Strategy" [in Chinese], Huanqiu Shibao, 17 October 2012, opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2012-10/3193760.html. All translations are by the author. 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries," 7 September 2013, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686 /t1076334.shtml. Initially viewed as little more than rhetorical flourish, the potential of the New Silk Road project to accelerate the reconfiguration of the global geoeconomic and institutional landscapes has become increasingly manifest. On 4 November 2014, Xi chaired a meeting of the Chinese Party-State's Leading Small Group on Financial Affairs (zhongyang caijing lingdao xiaozu) calling for the newly established Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to join Chinese policy banks in providing funds for projects in the transportation, electrical, and telecommunications sectors to further connect China with Central and West Asia. Together with the New Development Bank established by the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in July 2014, the China-sponsored AIIB is the second major development bank to be created outside of the US sphere of influence since the 1944 Bretton Woods accords. With a projected $100 billion in initial capital, it is poised to be a significant competitor for the US-and Japan-dominated Asian Development Bank. See "Xi Jinping: Jiakuai tuijin sichou zhilu jingjidai he 21 shiji haishang sichou zhilu jianshe" [Xi Jinping: Accelerating the construction of the Silk Road economic belt and the twenty-first-century maritime silk road], Xinhua, 6 November 2014. In maps published by the PRC's official Xinhua news agency, the terminus of both the terrestrial and maritime New Silk Roads is the Italian city of Venice. The symbolism this choice entails -the lagoon city is the home of Marco Polo, the famous European merchant who pioneered trade exchanges with Yuan China through the original thirteenth-century Silk Road -ought not to overshadow the fact that the Veneto region is a key junction connecting the Mediterranean space with Germany and the wider core of continental Europe. See the maps at www.xinhuanet.com/world/newsilkway/index.htm. 3. See "Remarks by President Park Geun-hye at the 2013 International Conference on Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia," 18 October 2013, www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room /Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=114334; "Remarks by Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the Twelfth Ministerial Meeting of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) Member States, 25 November 2013, Manama," www.mfa.gov.tr/remarks-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto %C4%9Flu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey-at-the-12th-ministerial-meeting-of-of-the-asia -cooperation-dialogue-_acd_-member-states_-25-november-2013_-manama.en.mfa; and President Vladimir Putin's speech at an expanded meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Heads of State, "Vladimir Putin Took Part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Dushanbe," 12 September 2014, eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/22943/print. and cyber space -the untapped economic and social potential that could be leveraged by better integrating the world's largest, richest, and most populated landmass is apparent to all parties concerned. For China, this agenda has an especially salient strategic dimension: ambitious proposals such as the promotion of a Eurasian single market are consistent with Beijing's broader pursuit of "world multipolarization, . . . a new situation for international relations featuring peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation." 4 Europe is a critically important interlocutor for China in this process of reconfiguration of the international system. In calling for more "democracy" and "harmony" in international relations, 5 Chinese officials echo the classical philosophical concept of he er bu tong (harmony in diversity) to argue for the equal legitimacy of an irreducible plurality of political and socioeconomic regimes. With its own peculiar breeds of capitalism and state-society relations -especially in the eurozone -and a set of strategic interests in its eastern and southern neighborhoods that are not necessarily aligned with US foreign policy priorities, the European Union stands out in the eyes of Chinese policymakers as potentially the world's most effective counterpoint to US hegemonism (baquanzhuyi).
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with most Western European countries and the European Economic Community in the 1970s, leaders in Beijing have invested significant energy, resources, and creativity in shaping China's engagement with Europe. In the early 2000s, as a vigorous European Commission led by former Italian prime minister Romano Prodi and Europe seemed poised to dramatically enhance the process of EU integration, then Chinese premier Wen Jiabao led efforts for closer cooperation with Brussels, culminating in the launch of the EU-China comprehensive strategic partnership in 2003. Contextually, Chinese academia registered a steep increase in funding and human resources allocated to EU studies, which in most cases absorbed or replaced established research agendas focusing on the former Soviet Union and individual European countries. 6 After 2005, failure to achieve the two major Chinese political goals of the time -the granting of market economy status and the lifting of the arms embargo by the EU -coupled with a perception of the enduring dominance of US desiderata over EU foreign policy making, led Chinese leaders to reassess their expectations of Brussels' capacity to operate as a fully autonomous pole in the international system. The recalibration of Beijing's approach, perfected in 2013 under Xi's stewardship, produced what could be termed China's current "Europes" policy: no longer an EU-centric approach, nor a collection of assorted bilateral relations, China's new engagement with Europe more systematically reflects the multilevel nature of governance in the European polity and the shifting power distribution among European states. At the EU level, Beijing reinforced its political commitment through Xi's visit to EU institutions in March 2014, the first such visit by a sitting president of the PRC and a strong signal coming just ahead of the European Parliament elections of May 2014 and the subsequent selection of the new presidents of the European Council and European Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Also of continental relevance, given its growing role as China's key "anchor" in Europe, 7 is the acceleration in the long-term deepening of the Sino-German comprehensive partnership, incorporating a strategic dialogue on diplomatic and security affairs. Bilaterally, China has been cultivating the other nine strategic partnerships it forged with EU member states between 2004 and 2012. Finally, in a notable departure from its consolidated practice, in 2013 Beijing launched a highly innovative 16+1 Central and Eastern Europe (Zhong Dong Ou) dialogue mechanism to increase its foreign policy traction with regard to both EU member states and candidate countries in the eastern subregion of Europe stretching from the Baltics to the Balkans.
West Asia and North Africa in Italy's and China's Strategic Calculus
Assessed against the background of the EU, China's relations with Italy reveal their peculiar strategic potential, which stretches well beyond the figures emerging from the interplay between the world's second-and ninthlargest economies. Especially since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, Italy's salience -at the EU, subregional, and bilateral levels -has steadily risen in China's foreign policy calculus. 9 At the EU level, the contingent reasons for Italy's particular relevance have shifted remarkably in the 2009 -14 period. Regarded as a systemic liability within the EU at the onset of the financial crisis -and one of such magnitude as to potentially cause the unraveling of the eurozone and thus creating chaos in the global economy -Rome has since reemerged as a vocal and influential player in the debate over the future of the EU. China played a role in this complicated transition. Despite widespread concerns among Chinese experts and officials about the Italian government's capacity to steer the country out of its most severe recession since the Second World War, 10 Chinese authorities chose to factor the sustainability of Italy's sovereign debt in their investment agenda and, contrary to other Asian central banks, the People's Bank of China continued to invest in Italian government bonds -albeit at shorter maturities -throughout this period. Two outcomes of this more assertive phase in Rome's EU policy are set to have an enduring impact on Sino-Italian relations. The only incumbent administration of a major EU member state to have received a strong mandate by the electorate to challenge the current economic policy priorities of the EU, the Italian government has been the leading proponent of a shift away from fiscal consolidation toward job-creating growth. Jean-Claude Juncker, who became president of the European Commission in November 2014, has proved sensitive to calls for a comprehensive revision of the EU economic policies. His political guidelines presented before the European Parliament plenary session in July 2014 contain an ambitious jobs, growth, and investment package with the aim to rekindle growth in the EU while strengthening the depleting industrial base across the union. 12 A neo-Keynesian turn in Brussels is vitally important for the Italian economy to recover without resorting to unsustainable debt creation, while healthier growth in the EU is a critical driver for China's own development, as Europe remains the world's main market for Chinese exports. Similarly significant, though more ambivalent as to the impact on relations with China in the medium term, is the European Commission's emphasis on manufacturing. While strategic for the Italian economy -which is the second-largest in Europe in terms of industry value added to gross domestic product (GDP) (20 percent in 2013 according to World Bank data) but has lost 25 percent of its manufacturing base 13. In one of her very first official declarations, High Representative Mogherini confirmed that "the EU considers the holding of 'presidential and parliamentary elections' in Donetsk and Luhansk on 2 November 2014 as illegal and illegitimate and will not recognize them." Council of the European Union, "Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the EU on 'Elections' in Eastern Ukraine," Brussels, 5 November 2014. The PRC's official position remains ambivalent. "China upholds the principle of noninterference in others' internal affairs and respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We hope that all parties will hold dear the ceasefire that is not easily achieved, keep calm, exercise restraint, properly resolve relevant differences through dialogue and consultation and work in concert to push for the political settlement of the crisis." See "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference, Beijing," Beijing, 3 November 2014, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1206855.shtml. during the financial crisis -the commission's drive to bring the contribution by industry to the EU's GDP back to 20 percent from its current 16 percent level is likely to spark increasing competition as China, too, invests heavily in industrial upgrade to compete at higher ends of the value chain.
A second consequential outcome of Italy's more perceivable footprint in Brussels is the appointment of the former Italian minister of foreign affairs, Federica Mogherini, as high representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. With a strong background in transatlantic relations, Moghe rini has signaled her commitment to a fresh approach to the EU's external agenda. In her former capacity as foreign minister of the country holding holder of the rotating presidency of the EU, the new high representativewho chose Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank as the destinations for her first trip abroad as confirmed head of Europe's diplomacy -has hinted at a less confrontational course of action vis-à-vis Russia with respect to the Ukraine crisis and at a more balanced distribution of Brussels' strategic focus across its eastern and southern areas. This shift brings the EU closer not only to Italy's core foreign policy priorities but also to the prevailing sentiment in Beijing. Alarmed by what they perceived as an inappropriately outspoken support for Ukraine's second "color revolution" by the previous EU leaders, as well as by surreptitious Russian-sponsored fragmentation of the Ukrainian state, Chinese officials are (quietly) comfortable with Mogherini's preference for engagement over confrontation with Moscow, as well as with her firm rejection of attempts to jeopardize Ukraine's territorial integrity through the "presidential and parliamentary elections" held in the Donetsk and Luhansk "People's Republics." 13 The new high representative's commitment to invest more EU political 14. The government of the PRC has been focusing on West Asia and North Africa as a unified region since the early 1970s through a dedicated bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The perimeter of this region is defined in both geographical and functional terms. Geographically Xi Ya Bei Fei broadly corresponds to the Middle East and North Africa region and functionally it covers the operations of multilateral organizations such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. For the purposes of this work, Xi Ya Bei Fei is treated as a regional security complex, the analytic cohesiveness of which is determined by proximity to the Mediterranean Sea and broad and intersecting patterns of instability propagated by networked militant Islamism. (See table 1 By 2013, despite a structural trimming of human resources (a 23 percent decrease over a decade), personnel in the region had risen to 768 personnel, reaching 18.7 percent of total diplomatic and nondiplomatic personnel in the administration of Italy's MFA. In 2013 Italy's embassy in Cairo was only marginally less staffed than that in Beijing, and both were among Italy's top five most heavily staffed in the world, along with the embassies in Washington, DC; Moscow; and Berlin. The centrality of the WANA region in Italy's foreign policy projection is also reflected in the allocation of development cooperation funds: nine of the twenty countries receiving the largest volumes of assistance (actual transfers) in 2013 were in this region. Similarly, some Instability across its southern and southeastern neighborhoods is thus a strategic liability for Italy, both in terms of rising risk premiums on its current economic engagement with partners in the region and for the severe constraints it poses to the development of further ties in an area that has traditionally been more approachable for those small and medium-sized enterprises constituting the stressed backbone of Italy's economy. At the same time, the proximity and immediacy of national security concerns have stimulated an urgent rethinking of the geopolitical landscape Rome is facing. Italy's lost salience as a stable conventional frontier of the free world during the Cold War has reemerged in the insidious shape of Europe's most exposed and porous border with areas incubating potentially devastating nontraditional threats by opaque and radical leaderships. With far fewer positional dividends to be gained in this new context at a time of relative retrenchment of the US presence in Europe and the Middle East, the Italian government's priority is to manage the rising costs of facing burgeoning influxes of immigrants, 19 the radicalization of young Muslims domestically, a civil war in Libya, and the emergence of centripetal dynamics among militant Islamists gathering around the banners of the Islamic State, which openly quotes Rome and the Vatican among its ultimate targets.
With seemingly contingent emergencies being recast as enduring challenges, the spectrum of viable foreign policy options has effectively been broadening for Italian authorities. At the EU level, attempts to envisage bolder forms of defense integration stand to gain traction, because fiscal constraints would not allow countries like Italy to pursue efficient reforms of their armed forces while at the same time increasing their capacity to 20 . See the statement issued following the meeting of Italy's Supreme Defense Council, Presidenza della Repubblica, "Il Presidente Napolitano ha presieduto il Consiglio Supremo di Difesa," Rome, 15 October 2014, www.quirinale.it/elementi/Continua.aspx?tipo=4&key=17194. 21. The "growing synergies on regional and global issues" were highlighted as the first remark on the consolidation of the Sino-Italian strategic partnership in the joint declaration issued at the end of the bilateral meeting between Italy's Renzi and PRC premier Li Keqiang in Rome, 14 October 2014. Officials from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, October 2014. take responsibility for an enhanced regional role through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 20 Bilaterally, and particularly with regard to China, the WANA region is home to several prime examples of countries where the strategic partnership between Rome and Beijing could experiment with innovative joint initiatives aimed at fostering security, stability, and economic development. 21 Faced with a widening interests-capabilities gap -whereby the magnitude and diversity of economic activities by Chinese operators in WANA far outpaces the political, military, and "soft-power" footprint of the PRC in the region -the Chinese party-state too requires influential and reliable partners to pursue two of its core interests in the region.
The first such interest is the territorial integrity of the PRC, threatened by increased restlessness in China's northwestern Xinjiang province. Home to more than 10 million Uyghurs, a sizeable Turkic-Muslim minority that is in fact a plurality within the province, Xinjiang has traditionally been the contested bastion for China's projection toward central Asia and, more recently, the center of nuclear and missile tests by the Chinese armed forces. With the escalation in China's energy imports, the salience of this province as a strategic junction of international energy corridors has risen steeply in recent decades, a trend set to be reinforced by the forthcoming development of the transport and telecommunication networks planned as part of Xi's New Silk Road vision. A stable Xinjiang is thus increasingly urgent at the very time when widespread frustration with enduring political, economic, social, and cultural deprivation has rendered segments of the Uyghur population more militant and amenable to Islamic fundamentalism. Building on a long history of rebellions in pursuit of an independent Turkestan, unrest and terrorist acts plagued the more orthodox and economically backward south of the province before spreading to Beijing (October 2013) and even Kunming in China's deep south (March 2014). Beijing faces both an internal challenge -whose dynamics appear increasingly to be beyond the capacity of the government to resolve through the current mix of heavy repression and pursuit of accelerated economic growth -and two external ones, both of which originate in the WANA region. The first external challenge is the pernicious spread of radical versions of Islam within Xinjiang; the second, an even more immediate one, consists of direct calls to launch a jihad against China and its people. In 2009 Algeria-based al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb called for revenge against China and declared Chinese workers legitimate targets; shortly thereafter, the Islamic State of Iraq released a video calling on Muslims to join the Uyghur jihadists and fight against China.
A second core interest Beijing must factor into its foreign policy calculus with regard to WANA -including bilateral and multilateral efforts aiming at mitigating the volatility of the region -is the preservation of a healthy global economic climate and a workable regional environment for China's own continued development. The WANA region forms a strategic quadrant in this respect. In excess of 43 percent of China's energy imports come from this region, and Chinese exports toward these markets have grown from 6.4 percent of the PRC's total exports in 2003 to 9.6 percent in 2013. Though still relatively modest, Chinese OFDI has been flourishing as well, accounting for a stock across the region worth $10.8 billion in 2012, on par with the rising aggregate value of contracts awarded to PRC companies ($37.7 billion in 2012) and the climbing number of relevant Chinese personnel, officially put at about 150,000 workers but likely to be much higher. 22 This rather sizeable economic interaction between China and countries in WANA is a recent development: of the twenty-nine countries included in this region for the purposes of this work, only Sudan could be said to have a meaningful trade relation with China in 2001. In 2012 -13 the share of trade with the PRC out of total trade with the world was above 7 percent for at least fifteen countries, with data missing for several others likely to post similar volumes (Eritrea, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Sudan, and United Arab Emirates). In at least five cases -Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger, and Yemen -the share is close to or above 20 percent. The trend is set for the region to develop rapidly and consolidate over time; in the midst of a vigorous debate on what forms of "creative interventionism" China should pursue -seeking to strike a new balance between its global economic interests and its traditionally noninterventionist foreign policy posture -the argument having the most traction in Beijing posits the necessity to induce greater economic dependency on China among countries in WANA as a surrogate of missing military-political influence. 23
Consolidating the Italian-Chinese Strategic Partnership through Cooperation in the Mediterranean
With the European project and the Atlantic Alliance at the core of its foreign policy, and the Mediterranean region and Russia as traditionally the furthest areas of substantial political projection, Italy never developed a full-fledged China policy. After the unraveling of a seemingly effective but highly personalized and ultimately fragile guanxi entente connecting apical political leaders from the two countries through to the early 1990s, 24 Italian governments only shifted to a more consistent engagement with China in the late 1990s owing to the efforts of Prime Minister Prodi (1996 -98) and President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . In 2004, under the second government led by Silvio Berlusconi, the two countries officially entered a strategic partnership designed to enhance the level of political dialogue, but also -and more urgently, from Rome's standpoint -to reframe diplomatic engagement on the rebalancing of what had evolved into a severely skewed economic relationship.
The political economy of Italian-Chinese relations is in fact rendered unique in Europe by three fundamental factors and two specific dynamics. The former are constituted by the presence -in both the Chinese and Italian 25. Giovanni Andornino, "The Political Economy of Italy's Relations with China," International Spectator 47, no. 2 (2012): 87 -101. 26. In 2010, in addition to being the recipient of a modest 2.5 percent of total Italian exports, the PRC was the final destination of only 1.6 percent of total "Made in Italy" exports worldwide. While on average "Made in Italy" products contributed some 40.5 percent to total Italian exports in 2010, the relevant quota for the PRC was a mere 26 percent. In subsequent years a positive trend emerged, and in 2013 the share of "Made in Italy" out of the total of Italian exports to China grew by 47 percent, reaching 38.3 percent. Various definitions are used in literature to identify "Made in Italy"; here an extensive approach has been adopted, including in this category consumer goods such as food, clothing, household appliances, automotive supplies, paper, furniture, luxury goods, furniture, and small leather goods. None of the bilateral trade data in this research includes the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. Statistics compiled by the author using UN Comtrade data, reporting country Italy, comtrade.un.org. In particular, the following SITC (rev. 4) groups of goods were considered: 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 09, 11, 42, 553, 554, 61, 64, 65, 77, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899. economies -of a strong manufacturing sector, heavy reliance on exports, and a distinctively low-tech production bias. The two dynamics that have developed upon these foundations may be characterized as asymmetrical competition and asynchronous opportunities generation. 25 Starting in the 1990s, the PRC's increasingly vigorous projection on global markets has been inducing a relentless competitive dynamic, with severe displacement of Italian companies across all of Italy's traditional production sectors, comprehensive restructuring of its small and medium enterprises, and a heavy toll on employment borne by the Italian society. Contextually, Italian businesses proved unable to fully exploit the opportunities offered by China's opening market.
This asynchrony of opportunities for Italian companies was to an extent inevitable, given that a sizeable section of national manufacturingspecialized in the production and export of consumer goods generally identified as "Made in Italy" -was unable to tap into any substantial demand for its products in a market that remained rather modest in size and comparatively underdeveloped in terms of its consumption patterns. 26 Despite official statements of goodwill and the negotiation of a first Three-Year Action Plan (2010 -13) reaffirming the original joint effort by the two governments to promote increased and more balanced trade, only marginal improvements would be achieved. Though Italian exports to China have been growing by an average of 8. The enduring economic pain associated with the PRC's rising profile in global trade across the world -including markets where Italian operators used to hold a consolidated edge -has had a profound impact on China's image among Italian citizens. For the most part scarcely informed about China's complex reality, with hardly any tradition of meaningful cultural interaction even with domestic Chinese immigrants, and rarely exposed to systematic discussions of what features a comprehensive, negotiated partnership with China should entail for Italy, the Italian public has consistently displayed one of the most unfavorable opinions of China among European countries. According to the Pew Research Global Attitudes project -whose results are echoed by other relevant surveys -in 2014 Italian respondents ranked behind only Japan and Vietnam in holding a negative perceptions of China. 27 Such an unenthusiastic outlook is reflected by political leaders: while the Italian government -and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -is regarded as a reliable and steady partner by Beijing, in Italy's parliament China is virtually uniformly discussed as a challenge to Italy's society, values, and national interest. 28 The tenuous support the PRC enjoys among Italian citizens is politically consequential. As vast and volatile sectors of a deeply frustrated Italian electorate seek culprits for the seemingly inexorable decline of living standards throughout the country, China may emerge as an ideal target. The mix of economic malaise in Italy, unease among traditional allies for China's increasingly perceivable footprint across Europe and the Mediterranean region, and the absence of established "normative entrepreneurs" capable of addressing entrenched skepticism in the Italian society may impose political constraints on Prime Minister Renzi and Premier Li's commitment to "open a new chapter" for "a real upgrade" in bilateral relations. Only in 2014 did Beijing appear to finally heed the need for some tangible public action to start addressing this slippery perception issue. Besides signing a new Three-Year Action Plan (2014 -16), now calling for an accelerated, if gradual, rebalancing of trade relations through a substantial increase of Italian exports of goods and services to China, 30 Chinese sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises have brought unprecedented dynamism to the previously negligible figures of China's direct investment in Italy. In a series of sudden moves on the Italian stock market, investment vehicles drawing on the vast foreign reserves of the People's Bank of China increased their equity holdings in seven strategic Italian companies to bring them just above 2 percent. While the cumulative value of such portfolio is in itself remarkable -over €3 billion as of 24 October 2014 -it is worth underlining the "signaling effect" of these actions: 2 percent is the lowest threshold requiring the Italian stock exchange monitoring commission to release a public report on "relevant shareholdings." China's suddenly rising profile in the Italian financial market -and media -was subject to much speculation, to the point of being referred to as resembling the "dawn of a second Marshall Plan . . . severing some relationships formed in postwar Europe." 31 In parallel with this spike in equity acquisition, two of China's largest state-owned enterprises sealed major industrial deals with Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, a public financial institution managing Italian postal savings and progressively morphing into Italy's own development bank. For a total of €2.5 billion they acquired 35 percent of CDP Reti and 40 percent of Ansaldo Energia, the former controlling Italy's electricity and gas grids and the latter being Italy's largest manufacturer of power generation equipment (table  2) . More agreements were signed in October 2014 during Premier Li's official visit to Rome: €3 billion have been earmarked for joint investment in infrastructure, equity acquisition, export promotion, and support for small and medium enterprises. While these memoranda have yet to generate their effects, they follow Prime Minister Renzi's strong call for further investment from China, especially in the form of job-generating greenfield investments.
32. Italy was last a member of the UN Security Council in 2007 -8, immediately before the destabilization of the WANA region. Over these two years 134 votes were held, 56 of which (42 percent) were specifically relevant to the region; Italy and China's voting patterns converged in all instances except one.
As both Italy and China rely on WANA to service around half of their energy needs -and share the perception of a direct security challenge emanating from this fractious geopolitical quadrant -cooperation to mitigate spillover effects and stabilize the region would allow for a stronger bilateral relation to be constructed through multilateral regional engagement. Save for the inevitable discomfort that such a course of action would generate among traditional allies, most notably the United States, available indicators do not point to a lack of common political ground for Rome and Beijing to pursue more ambitious agendas. To the contrary: analyzing voting records at the General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council as a proxy to assess the level of political convergence or divergence between the two governments, what emerges is a picture in which the level of political divergence on issues connected to WANA is consistently lower than the average. 32 Source: Author's extrapolation from data published by the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB).
At the General Assembly, a total of sixty-three resolutions were passed during the sixty-eighth session (2013 -14) ; the Italian and Chinese representatives converged on the same voting pattern 54 percent of the time, diverged mildly (with one of the two abstaining) in 25 percent of the votes, and voted outright against the other's position in 21 percent of cases. Figures are perceptably more positive when only votes relevant to the WANA region (onethird of the total) are taken into account. Here convergence rates rise to 74 percent, mild divergence is reduced to 17 percent, and severe divergence drops to 9 percent.
At the UN Human Rights Council, where the normative dimension is necessarily prevalent, data paint an unsurprisingly more ambivalent picture, but here too an analysis of voting records specifically relevant to WANA points to lower than average divergence. Examining voting records of council sessions nineteen to twenty-seven (February 2012 to September 2014) -including special sessions -one sees that out of a total of sixty votes taken, Italy and China diverge 83 percent of the time (mild divergence 25 percent and severe divergence 58 percent). However, figures for the twenty-one votes taken on WANA show overall divergence dropping to 72 percent, with cases of the two countries' representatives voting against each other's agenda (severe divergence) dropping below the 50 percent threshold (48 percent).
Lack of established practices and protocols for engagement is the single most immediate factor preventing more intense cooperation between Italy and China across WANA. At a more fundamental level, however, both players have yet to effectively cast a foreign policy agenda for the "deeper" Mediterranean region they are facing. For the Italian government, this entails pursuing a reorientation of the EU's strategic gaze toward what ought to be understood as a regional security complex embracing Mediterranean littoral states -including the EU's south -and those neighboring states to which the former are connected through intersecting patterns of instability propagated by networked militant Islamism.
In the case of China, casting a new policy agenda implies breaking out of a bureaucratic-cum-conceptual silo mentality whereby Europe and the WANA region are looked at as entirely separate entities. Early attempts by Beijing to replicate its diplomatic success in Central and Eastern Europe by proposing similar ad hoc initiatives to a grouping of Southern European countries in 33. This agenda has found some initial traction through the Sino-Italian track-two bilateral dialogue mechanism established by the Torino World Affairs Institute and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. Following three iterations at the strictly bilateral level, the dialogue is set to be partly broadened in a Southern Europe, West Asia, North Africa format starting in 2015. 2010 are a testimony of this approach. They were met with less than lukewarm support by Italian authorities, who would not wish to increase Brussels' frustration by supporting a further segmentation of the European space in terms of China's political access points. Both Chinese officials and scholars have since reiterated this design, while efforts to devise broader formats encompassing Southern Europe, West Asia, and North Africa (a more comprehensive Nan Ou Xi Ya Bei Fei region) are mired by both administrative and cognitive barriers. 33 The conversion undertaken by Chinese academic and research institutions, which saw an established tradition of countryspecific studies shift towards broader EU research themes -often monopolized by a focus on EU institutions and major member states -has played a significant role in this. As the footprint of the community of Italy watchers in China remains very light, the specificity of Italy as a pillar of the EU and an anchor for stability in the Mediterranean has so far failed to be leveraged.
Inadequate commitment in finding common ground for joint political efforts in the WANA region, however, is likely to have negative consequences in both the short and medium term. In the short term, both Italy and China -two countries sharing an unequivocal interest in stability in the Mediterranean -stand to lose from missing an opportunity to combine forces to address what remains an emergency situation across the region. Over the medium term, as table 1 suggests, Italian economic interests are set to face even more intense competition from China (as well as from a number of other emerging actors) in the region regardless of the shape it takes. Failure to consolidate the societal foundations of the Italian-Chinese strategic partnership at this juncture by pursuing positive-sum games both bilaterally and regionally may thus sow the seeds of less promising times down the road.
